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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is an art to the game of Blackjack.  The rules are fixed, and while lady luck 
surely plays her role, the rules and odds are well known to a wise player before he 
places his bet on the green felt table-top.  But what if one day the dealer changed the 
rules in the middle of the game? What if the dealer simply declared that any 
combination of cards it dealt to itself equaled twenty-one?  No doubt, the player 
would cry foul, and with good and honest reason.  “Rules are rules,” says the player, 
trying to reason with the dealer.  The player opens his rulebook to show the dealer 
that there is no such rule.  Then, to add insult to injury, the dealer simply declares 
that he has always had this power, only he had forgotten it for several years.  The 
dealer explains that his power transcends the rulebook.  Does this situation seem 
fair?  
Unfortunately, this story’s parallel is occurring today in many federal district 
courts with a “rediscovered” use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.1  Recently, 
federal district courts have held that Federal Rule 21 bestows upon them the power 
to sever nondiverse parties or claims to create diversity jurisdiction without first 
finding that a party or claim is improperly joined.2  Severance may mean that a 
plaintiff who brings a state court action against multiple parties, one or more of 
which is not diverse, runs the risk of a federal court severing the action in a removal 
analysis, even where the plaintiff has committed no improper joinder of parties.  
Severance may leave a plaintiff with the need to conduct simultaneous suits—one in 
state court and one in federal court.  Other federal district courts, however, have 
correctly declined to sever properly joined nondiverse parties.3 
                                                          
 
1
 See Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The Improper Party 
Problem in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 824 (2006). 
 
2
 See Safeco Ins. Co. v. City of White House, 36 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Rule 21 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a district court to retain diversity jurisdiction 
over a case by dropping a nondiverse party if that party’s presence in the action is not required 
. . . .”); Joseph v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 868, 872 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (“I can retain 
jurisdiction by severing claims against nondiverse dispensable defendants.”); DeGidio v. 
Centocor, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-721, 2009 WL 1867676, at *4 (N.D. Ohio June 29, 2009); 
Williams v. Knoll Pharm. Co., No. 5:03-CV-8030, at *6 (N.D. Ohio July 11, 2003) (PACER) 
(“Rule 21 applies to the dismissal of properly joined parties as well as misjoined parties.”). 
 
3
 See Hughes v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 2:09-CV-93, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82550  
(N.D. W. Va. Sept. 2, 2009) (requiring a finding of misjoinder before utilizing Federal Rule 
21 to sever claims); Ash v. Providence Hosp., No. 08-0525-WS-M, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12794, at *44 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2009) (declining to sever parties because of the court’s 
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Through an analysis of the purposes and limitations of removal and the proper 
role of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rule”), this Note concludes 
that the use of Federal Rule 21 to create diversity jurisdiction where all parties are 
properly joined is improper.  Parts III and IV of this Note review the qualifiers 
necessary for diversity jurisdiction, the history and parameters of removal, and the 
judicial doctrines of fraudulent joinder and procedural misjoinder.  Parts V and VI 
demonstrate that the misuse of Federal Rule 21 to create diversity jurisdiction in 
removal actions where parties are properly joined has been supported by either a 
misreading of or an unwarranted extension of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain,4 a disregard for the proper role of the 
Federal Rules in relation to the interplay of judicial exercise and Congressional 
oversight, and by ignoring the unfair consequences that misuse of the Rule places on 
the parties to the action.   
Arguably, such a misuse of Federal Rule 21 not only flouts the separation of 
powers by treading into territory that Congress controls, but it also conflicts with the 
self-limitations imposed by the Federal Rules themselves5 and can result in undue 
hardship on plaintiffs.6  Part VII examines the possible solutions to the problem and 
ultimately concludes that the best solution is for the judiciary to exercise self-
restraint in its application of Federal Rule 21.  Alternatively, Congress could either 
amend the removal or diversity statutes, or it could exercise its oversight powers 
with regard to the Federal Rules themselves to remedy this misuse of Federal Rule 
21.7  
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL RULE 21 
A.  The English Rules & The Judicature Acts 
Originally, the English common law produced dismissal in most cases where 
courts found misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties.8   This harsh effect, however, was 
largely alleviated in the process of the codification of procedural rules.9  Codification 
of civil procedure in the federal equity rules and the English rules of practice 
allowed corrections to complaints to cure joinder defects where corrections would 
produce no adverse effects on the parties to the action.10  The historical antecedent 
                                                          
“reluctance to manufacture federal jurisdiction via artificial means in a case where none exists 
. . . .”); Etheridge v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No. 3:08CV004-SA-DS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67244, 
at *9 (declining to sever under Federal Rule 21 where the court found no misjoinder); Culhane 
Commc’ns v. Fuller, 489 F. Supp. 2d 959, 962 (D. S.D. 2007) (refusing to sever under Federal 
Rule 21 where the court found no misjoinder of parties). 
 
4
 Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989). 
 
5
 See infra Parts VI.D-E. 
 
6
 See infra Part VI.E. 
 
7
 See Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) (stating that Congress has a “long-
recognized power . . . to prescribe . . . rules for federal courts . . . .”). 
 
8
 See 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1681 (3d ed. 
2010). 
 
9
 See id.  
 
10
 See id.  
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rule to Federal Rule 21 existed in the English procedural rules, later codified in The 
Judicature Act of 1937.11  But even before the Judicature Acts, the rules of procedure 
recognized that there were instances when parties or claims had been improperly 
joined or omitted, and that judicial action may be necessary to add or drop one or 
more parties or claims in the interest of efficient justice.12   
The Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 discussed when claims and parties 
were improperly joined under the heading of “Nonjoinder and Misjoinder.”13  In the 
interest of efficiency, it was not necessary that every defendant joined in an action be 
responsible for either the entire amount claimed by the plaintiff or every cause of 
action.14  Courts and judges had the power to either drop misjoined parties and 
claims or to order separate trials, but only if no injustice would result and only if the 
party to be dropped were added to the action without her consent.15  The principle of 
efficiency guided all early procedural rules.  “[T]he sooner the parties get at the truth 
of the matter the better for both of them, that it may end litigation . . . And . . . this 
vital essence is infused into all civil procedure.”16  Therefore, then, as today, civil 
procedure sought to maintain the spirit of efficiency; limited, however, by the 
possibility of injustice to the parties.  
The English Supreme Court Judicature Act of 1875, though it simplified the 
language of the earlier acts, largely paralleled them in regard to dropping misjoined 
claims and parties.17  Rule 13 of this Act continued the directive that a finding of 
misjoinder was a necessary qualifier to exercising the judicial procedural power to 
drop claims or parties.18  For instance, when two plaintiffs brought suit against a 
                                                          
 
11
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 21, advisory committee’s note (citing English Rules Under the 
Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 16 r. 11). 
 
12
 See The Common Law Procedure Act of 1852, O. XXXIV - XLI, reprinted in THE 
COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACTS OF 1852, 1854, AND 1860 74-80 (W.F. Finlason ed., 1860). 
 
13
 See id.  
 
14
 See W.F. FINLASON, AN EXPOSITION OF OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND CIVIL PROCEDURE AS 
RECONSTRUCTED UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACTS INCLUDING THE ACT OF 1876 WITH COMMENTS 
ON THEIR EFFECT AND OPERATION 283 (1877).  “And where in any action, whether founded 
upon contract or otherwise, the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he may be 
entitled to redress, he may join two or more defendants, to the intent that in the action the 
question as to which if any of them is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as 
between all parties to the action.”  Id. 
 
15
 THE COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACTS, supra note 12, at 74 (“It shall and may be lawful 
for the court or judge . . . to order . . . any person[s] . . . originally joined as plaintiff[s] . . . 
struck out . . . if it shall appear to such court or judge that injustice will not be done by such 
amendment . . . and that the person[s] . . . to be struck out . . . were originally introduced 
without his[] [or] her, or their consent . . . .”).  The same rule applied to defendants.  See id. at 
77. 
 
16
 FINLASON, supra note 14, at 274. 
 
17
 See Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875, O. 16 r. 13, reprinted in THE NEW SYSTEM 
OF PRACTICE AND PLEADING UNDER THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS, 1873, 1875, 
1877, THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION ACT, 1876, AND THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 463 
(William Thos. Charley ed., 1877). 
 
18
 Id.  (“[A] Judge may, at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the 
application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court or a Judge to be just, 
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defendant company for polluting a stream for which both plaintiffs had an interest, 19 
the judge proceeded as if the claims were separate, but only after finding that they 
had been misjoined because the interest was not common between them.20  Rule 13 
required misjoinder prior to the judge’s action of separating these claims.  While 
these English rules were statutorily created, the process for rule creation in America 
today is guided by the judiciary. 
B.  American Rule Creation 
While the Constitution grants Congress the power to prescribe procedural rules 
for inferior federal courts,21 Congress, by enacting the Rules Enabling Act in 1934,22 
delegated this power to the Supreme Court.  Later, in 1958, Congress transferred the 
bulk of rulemaking power from the Supreme Court to the Judicial Conference of the 
United States.23  The Judicial Conference submits its rules to the Supreme Court for 
approval, and Congress can either approve the rules or allow them to become law by 
inaction.24  The enacted Federal Rules have “the force and effect” of law, and they 
supersede prior inconsistent statutes.25   
Since the passage of the Rules Enabling Act and the implementation of Federal 
Rule 21, the rule-making process has trended away from Supreme Court 
centralization and more toward a multi-layered and formalistic process.26  In 1958, 
Congress required the Judicial Standing Committee to “carry on a continuous study 
of the operation and effect” and to recommend “changes in and additions to those 
rules as . . . desirable to promote simplicity . . . , fairness . . . , the just determination 
of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”27  Currently, 
                                                          
order that the . . . parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, improperly joined be struck 
out . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 
19
 See Appleton v. The Chapel Town Paper Co., 45 L.J. Ch. 276 (1877), reprinted in THE 
NEW SYSTEM OF PRACTICE AND PLEADING UNDER THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE ACTS, 
1873, 1875, 1877, THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION ACT, 1876, AND THE RULES OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 463 (William Thos. Charley ed., 1877). 
 
20
 See id. 
 
21
 See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
 
22
 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in current form at 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 2071-77 (West 2010)). 
 
23
 See A Brief History of the Federal Rulemaking Process, THE THIRD BRANCH 
(Newsletter of the Federal Courts, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2009, at 7, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/TTBViewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/News/TTB/
archive/2009-10%20Oct.pdf?page=7. 
 
24
 See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2074, 2075 (West 2010). 
 
25
 See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 656 (1996) (“In the Rules Enabling Act, 
Congress ordered that, in matters of ‘practice and procedure,’ the Federal Rules shall govern, 
and ‘[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect . . . .’”) (citation 
omitted). 
 
26
 Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1105 (2002). 
 
27
 Id. at 1107 (citation omitted). 
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amendments to the Federal Rules proceed through the Advisory Committee, the 
Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and if approved 
by these entities, amendments become effective unless Congress acts to prevent 
them.28  Therefore, the process to amend a Rule has changed dramatically since the 
implementation of Federal Rule 21, and it now involves more than simple Supreme 
Court approval. 
C.  Modern Federal Rule 21 
The plain language of Federal Rule 21 is clear.  Federal Rule 21 is entitled 
Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties, and it states: “Misjoinder of parties is not a 
ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, 
on just terms, add or drop a party.  The court may also sever any claim against a 
party.”29  By its title and plain language, Federal Rule 21 applies when parties are 
misjoined or nonjoined; here, the court may add a party, drop a party, or sever 
claims, if these actions are just.  Such a reading is consistent with Federal Rule 21’s 
historical ancestors.30  The historical purpose of Federal Rule 21 coincides with the 
plain language of the Rule itself. 
Federal Rule 21 is a derivative of the English rules of procedure in practice at the 
time the American Federal Rules became effective.31  One purpose of the Rule is to 
“promote liberal joinder of parties.”32  In 1940, Judge Kalodner wrote that “Rule[] . . 
. 21 . . . evidence[s] the general purpose . . . to eliminate the old restrictive and 
inflexible rules of joinder designed for a day when formalism was the vogue and to 
allow joinder of interested parties liberally to the end that an unnecessary 
multiplicity of actions thus might be avoided.”33  In 1958, the Second Circuit 
explained the purpose of Federal Rule 21 as an “obviat[ion of] the harsh common 
law adherence to the technical rules of joinder and not in order to deal with problems 
of defective federal jurisdiction.”34 Fairness and efficiency comprised Federal Rule 
21’s original intent in handling nonjoined and misjoined parties.  To understand this 
Note’s context of the misuse of Federal Rule 21, it is first important to understand 
the present day situations in which claims or parties are properly joined, when they 
are misjoined, and the removal process based on diversity jurisdiction. 
                                                          
 
28
 Id.  
 
29
  FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 
30
  See supra Part II.A. 
 
31
 WRIGHT, ET. AL., supra note 8; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 21 advisory committee’s note 
(citing English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 16 r. 11). 
 
32
 WRIGHT, ET. AL., supra note 8. 
 
33
 Soc’y of European Stage Authors & Composers v. WCAU Broad. Co., 1 F.R.D. 264, 
266 (E.D. Pa. 1940). 
 
34
 Kerr v. Compagnie De Ultramar, 250 F.2d 860, 864 (2d Cir. 1958) (citation omitted).  
But see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of White House, 36 F.3d 540, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(declining to follow Kerr because “most courts have not restricted the application of Rule 21 
and continue to apply the rule to retain federal diversity jurisdiction over a case.”) (citation 
omitted). 
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III.  PROCEDURAL CONTEXT: REMOVAL & DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
Removal is not a constitutional power of the federal courts; rather, it is a power 
granted to the federal courts by Congress.35  Congress first established the removal 
process in 1789 as a means of granting civil suit defendants a level of control over 
forum selection.36  A defendant may remove to federal court any civil action that a 
plaintiff files against him in state court but over which the federal district court has 
original jurisdiction.37  Federal courts have original jurisdiction if the claim fulfills 
the elements necessary for either federal question38 or diversity jurisdiction.39  For a 
federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction over an action, no plaintiff can be a 
citizen of the same state as any defendant,40 and the amount in controversy must 
exceed $75,000.41  Because the existence of original jurisdiction is a requirement of 
removal, the court must evaluate the case for diversity jurisdiction at the time in 
which the defendant files his notice of removal.42  To properly consider removing a 
case, the federal court must thoroughly examine the joinder of all parties. 
IV.  THE FEDERAL JOINDER RULES & THE MISJOINDER DOCTRINES 
Courts have developed two doctrines by which they measure improper joinder.  
These two doctrines are: (1) the fraudulent joinder doctrine43 and (2) the procedural 
misjoinder doctrine.44  If the court finds a party to be improperly joined, the court 
will ignore that party in its determination of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction 
over the action.45  A finding of misjoinder, therefore, may confer diversity 
jurisdiction upon the court where the face of the complaint shows a lack of complete 
diversity. 
A.  Federal Rule 19: Required Joinder 
Federal Rule 19 governs required joinder of parties.46  Subsection (a) governs 
when a party is necessary for just adjudication.47  If the party is necessary, but her 
                                                          
 
35
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 2010). 
 
36
 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79. 
 
37
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (West 2010); see also Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 
430 (1999) (“[A]n action may be removed . . . to federal court only if a federal district court 
would have original jurisdiction over the claim in suit.”). 
 
38
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2010). 
 
39
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2010). 
 
40
 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity of parties). 
 
41
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a) (West 2010). 
 
42
 See Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004); Boelens v. 
Redman Homes, Inc., 759 F.2d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 
43
 See infra Part IV.C. 
 
44
 See infra Part IV.D. 
 
45
 See, e.g., Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 1999).  
 
46
 FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
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presence destroys diversity jurisdiction, subsection (b) provides a balancing test to 
determine whether the party is indispensable to the action.48  If the party is found to 
be dispensable, then the court may continue to hear the case without that party.49  If 
the party is indispensable, the court may dismiss the case,50 but it may proceed even 
without the required party.51  Dismissal should be “employed only sparingly.”52  
Only upon the impossibility of just resolution of the case should the absence of 
nondiverse parties terminate an action.53  
B.  Federal Rule 20: Permissive Joinder 
Federal Rule 20 governs when parties may properly permissively join or be 
joined to an action.54  Permissively joined parties must have an interest in claims that 
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences, and the parties must share a common question of law or fact.55  
Generally, this requirement is fulfilled “[if t]here is a substantial logical relationship 
between the transactions or occurrences at issue.”56  Once the requirements for 
                                                          
 
47
 Under Federal Rule 19(a), “a party is [necessary] if: (1) complete relief cannot be given 
to existing parties in his absence; (2) disposition in his absence may impair his ability to 
protect his interest in the controversy; or (3) his absence would expose existing parties to 
substantial risk of double or inconsistent obligations.” Safeco Ins. Co. v. City of White House, 
36 F.3d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1) & (2)(i)-(ii)). 
 
48
 A party is determined to be dispensable or indispensable by weighing the following 
factors:  
(1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice 
that person or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be 
lessened or avoided . . . ; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence 
would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if 
the action were dismissed for non-joinder. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). But see Soberay Mach. & Equip. Co. v. MRF Ltd., Inc., 181 F.3d 759, 
765 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here is no prescribed formula for determining whether a party is 
indispensable[.]”) (citation omitted). 
 
49
 FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
 
50
 Id.  
 
51
 Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 862 (2008) (“The Rule instructs that 
nonjoinder even of a required person does not always result in dismissal.”).  
 
52
 Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. Keal Driveaway Co., 173 F.3d 915, 918 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 
53
 Jaser v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n, 815 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 
54
 “Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if[] any right to relief is asserted 
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and any question of law or 
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). 
 
55
 Jaloy Mfg. Co., v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 736 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 
56
 DLX, Inc., v. Reid Brothers Inc., No. 5:09-CV-341-FL, 2010 WL 4496794, at *3 
(E.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 2010). 
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permissive joinder are met, it is the plaintiff’s option to permissively join the party.57  
If the requirements of Federal Rule 20 are not met as to a named defendant, then 
joinder is improper.58  
C.  The Doctrine of Fraudulent Joinder 
It is inevitable that plaintiffs will join nondiverse parties in state actions to 
prevent the removal of a claim that would otherwise fulfill diversity; they have 
attempted to do so for more than a century.59  The fraudulent joinder doctrine focuses 
the validity of a claim brought against a non-diverse defendant or on the validity of a 
claim between a joined non-diverse plaintiff and the defendant.  Although the 
standard for finding fraudulent joinder is not uniform,60 the fraudulent joinder 
doctrine generally applies when a plaintiff joins either a nondiverse defendant 
against whom the plaintiff has no reasonable basis for the claim, or where a 
nondiverse co-plaintiff is joined who has no reasonable basis for the claim against 
the defendant.61   
The right of a defendant to remove a case cannot be trumped by the “fraudulent 
joinder of a resident defendant [or non-diverse plaintiff] having no real connection 
with the controversy.”62  If a court finds fraudulent joinder, this finding operates as 
an exception to the necessity of diversity jurisdiction, and the court may disregard 
the improperly joined nondiverse party in considering how to proceed.63  The court 
may then utilize Federal Rule 21 to drop the fraudulently joined party and retain 
diversity jurisdiction between the diverse parties.64  Here, it cannot be said the court 
creates diversity jurisdiction by dropping the fraudulently joined party; rather, it 
simply already enjoyed diversity jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not properly 
join the nondiverse defendant. 
D.  The Doctrine of Fraudulent Misjoinder 
While the fraudulent joinder doctrine focuses on the validity of the claims 
brought against a nondiverse defendant, fraudulent misjoinder focuses on the 
                                                          
 
57
 Applewhite v. Reichhold Chem. Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 
58
 Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 
59
 E. Farish Percy, Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder 
Doctrine, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 620 (2006). 
 
60
 For a discussion of the different standards for fraudulent joinder, see id. at 578-79. 
 
61
 See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 183-84 (1906). 
 
62
 Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 (1914). 
 
63
  Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904 (6th Cir. 1998). It is 
important to note that although the term “fraudulent joinder” encompasses actual fraud by 
plaintiffs and attorneys, it is a broader term that also includes actions in which plaintiffs hold a 
genuine belief that the nondiverse defendant is properly joined. See Rose v. Giomatti, 721 F. 
Supp. 906, 914 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (“[T]he term ‘fraudulent joinder’ is a term of art and is not 
intended to impugn the integrity of a plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel.”). 
 
64
 See Smith v. Planned Parenthood, 225 F.R.D. 233, 246 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (finding 
misjoinder and severing the nondiverse party); Disparate v. Corporate Exec. Bd., 233 F.R.D. 
7, 12 (D.D.C. 2004); Hanna v. Gravett, 262 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (E.D. Va. 2003); Hines & 
Gensler, supra note 1, at 796. 
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relationship of the plaintiff’s claims against the diverse defendant to the plaintiff’s 
claims against the nondiverse defendant.65  Under this doctrine, neither may a non-
diverse co-plaintiff with a valid but unrelated claim against the defendant be joined 
to defeat diversity.66  Here, all claims are valid, but the relationships between the 
various claims do not meet the necessary requirements for permissive joinder under 
Federal Rule 20.67  For two parties to be properly permissively joined, the claims 
must “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences,” and they must share a common question of law or fact.68  For example, 
the court, by applying the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine, may exercise diversity 
jurisdiction in removal over a plaintiff’s claim against a diverse defendant by finding 
that the claim against the nondiverse defendant is not sufficiently related to the claim 
against the diverse defendant. 69  The court can then sever the claims pursuant to 
Federal Rule 21.70  Once the court severs the claims, it must remand the claim 
against the nondiverse defendant to state court.71   
Unlike the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder 
has not been adopted uniformly by federal or circuit courts, and some courts refuse 
to recognize the doctrine altogether.72  A court should not proceed to severance 
                                                          
 
65
 See generally Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996). 
Tapscott is often credited as the first case to utilize the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine. 
 
66
 Stacey L. Drentlaw, Procedural Misjoinder: A New Avenue to Federal Court?, 2010 
A.B.A. SEC. MASS TORTS LITIG. COMM. 3. 
 
67
 See supra Part IV.B.   
 
68
 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). 
 
69
 Tapscott, 77 F.3d at 1360 (finding “no real connection” between the claims against a 
diverse and nondiverse defendant). 
 
70
 In re Fosomax Prods. Liab. Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 57473, at *43-44 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 28, 2008) (“Where fraudulent misjoinder is found, courts sever the misjoined party 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, thereby preserving diversity jurisdiction over 
the remainder of the action.”); Frankland v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 2:07-cv-1767, 
2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 105534, at *9 (W.D. La. July 2, 2008) (“[I]n cases such as this in which 
the court is able to determine whether claims are misjoined on the basis of the pleadings, the 
court may choose to sever claims on its own initiative, in the interest of judicial efficiency, 
and remand only the improperly joined claims, while retaining those claims properly within its 
jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added). 
 
71
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (West 2010).  
 
72
 The Eleventh Circuit adopted the procedural misjoinder doctrine, while the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits have both cited Tapscott favorably without definitively adopting fraudulent 
misjoinder.  Stacey L. Drentlaw, Procedural Misjoinder: A New Avenue to Federal Court?, 
2010 A.B.A. SEC. MASS TORTS LITIG. COMM. 4 (citing Tapscott, 77 F.3d 1353 (adopting the 
fraudulent misjoinder doctrine)); In re Benjamin Moore & Co., 318 F.3d 626, 630-31 (5th Cir. 
2002) (“[W]ithout detracting from the force of the Tapscott principle that fraudulent 
misjoinder of plaintiffs is no more permissible than fraudulent misjoinder of defendants to 
circumvent diversity jurisdiction, we do not reach its application in this case.”); California 
Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v. Cummins Engine Co., 24 Fed. App’x 727, 729 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“For purposes of discussion we will assume, without deciding, that this circuit would accept 
the doctrines of fraudulent and egregious joinder as applied to plaintiffs.”). The Eighth Circuit 
has declined to adopt or reject the doctrine.   In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 
622 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We make no judgment on the propriety of the [fraudulent misjoinder] 
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under Federal Rule 21 without first finding fraudulent joinder or misjoinder.  To 
understand how district courts have arrived at improperly utilizing Federal Rule 21, 
it is first important to understand the Supreme Court’s Newman-Green v. Alfonzo 
Larrain decision, on which a number of these district courts rely.73 
V.  THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM 
A.  Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain 74 
The issue presented in Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain was whether a 
non-diverse defendant that spoils diversity jurisdiction could be dropped from an 
action thus allowing the federal court to retain jurisdiction over the remainder of the 
action.75  Newman-Green, an Illinois corporation, alleged failure to pay contractual 
royalties and filed suit against a Venezuelan corporation and five individuals.76  The 
trial court proceeded to the merits and granted summary judgment for the 
defendants, and Newman-Green appealed.77   
At a Seventh Circuit panel hearing, the court questioned whether the district 
court had established jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of the case because one 
defendant was “stateless.”78  Under the statutory jurisdiction invoked by the plaintiff, 
jurisdiction exists when a citizen of one state sues a citizen of a foreign country and 
a citizen of a state diverse from the plaintiff’s state.79  Bettison, one of the named 
defendants, was a citizen of the United States, but was domiciled in Venezuela,80 and 
the other four individual defendants were citizens of Venezuela.81  Bettison was 
neither a citizen of Venezuela, nor was he a citizen of any state; therefore, the 
plaintiff did not meet the statutory qualifications for jurisdiction.  The Seventh 
Circuit panel, finding a lack of jurisdiction, then held that Federal Rule 21 conferred 
upon them the power to dismiss Bettison as a dispensable party, thereby perfecting 
the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).82 
                                                          
doctrine in this case, and decline to either adopt or reject it at this time.”). The Supreme Court 
has not yet heard the issue.  
This Note proceeds under the notion that the doctrine of misjoinder, when adopted by a 
federal court, is an appropriate means of activating Rule 21’s severance power. Whether the 
doctrine of misjoinder is itself an appropriate or efficient use of judicial power is beyond the 
scope of this Note. For further discussion on the propriety of the doctrine of misjoinder, see 
generally, Hines & Gensler, supra note 1 and Percy, supra note 59.  
 
73
 Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989). 
 
74
 Id. 
 
75
 See generally id.  
 
76
 Id. at 828.  
 
77
 Id.  
 
78
 Id.  
 
79
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)(3) (West 2010). 
 
80
 Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 828.  
 
81
 Id.  
 
82
 Id. at 829.   
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The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, however, came to a different conclusion, 
and reversed that decision.83  Judge Posner wrote that Federal Rule 21 does not 
“empower[] appellate courts to dismiss a dispensable party whose presence spoils 
statutory diversity jurisdiction.”84  The Seventh Circuit, however, believed that as the 
Federal Rules apply to district courts, the district court could dismiss Bettison, and it 
remanded the case for that court to consider dropping him.85   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict of whether an 
appellate court could “dismiss jurisdictional spoilers like Bettison.”86  The Supreme 
Court then reversed the en banc Seventh Circuit opinion and held that appellate 
courts have the power to dismiss dispensable non-diverse parties from an action.87  It 
is important, however, to observe what the Court did not hold in Newman-Green.  
The Court declined to decide in a definitive manner whether Federal Rule 21 grants 
district courts the power to confer jurisdiction retroactively by dismissing a non-
diverse party.88  The Court, instead, stated that it is “well-settled that Rule 21 invests 
district courts with authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped 
at any time, even after judgment has been rendered.”89   
This reasoning is circular. The Court cites one interpretation of Federal Rule 21 
by only some inferior federal courts as determinative.90  But widespread misuse of a 
Federal Rule by lower courts may hardly be “well-settled.”  Indeed, if anything is 
well-settled, it is that circuit courts and district courts are inferior to the Supreme 
Court, and the Supreme Court could have specifically held that Federal Rule 21 
grants this power to a district court if it deemed such a holding appropriate.  Instead, 
the circular reasoning of the Court represents that this power is well-settled not 
because Federal Rule 21 itself confers this power, but because a number of courts 
have previously exercised this power.   
As Justice Kennedy’s dissent notes, however, “it has never been the rule that 
federal courts, whose jurisdiction is created and limited by statute, acquire power by 
adverse possession.”91  Further, the dissent recognizes that Federal Rule 21 governs 
                                                          
 
83
 Id.  
 
84
 Id.  
 
85
 Id. at 830.  
 
86
 Id.  
 
87
 Id. at 837. Dicta, however, placed restrictions upon such a ruling. See id. at 837-38. 
 
88
 Id. at 839 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In refusing to explicitly hold that Federal Rule 21 
grants this power, the majority wrote, “[a]lmost every modern Court of Appeals faced with 
this issue has concluded that it has the authority to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party by 
virtue of Rule 21. . . . [W]e are reluctant to disturb this well-settled judicial construction . . . .” 
Id. at 833 (majority opinion).  
 
89
 Id. at 832 (majority opinion).  
 
90
 Id. at 832, n.6; see also Fritz v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 751 F.2d 1152, 1154-55 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Roman Ceramics Corp., 603 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (3rd Cir. 
1979); Caperton v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 585 F.2d 683, 691-92 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 
91
 Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 839 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The 
doctrine of adverse possession provides that one who exercises open and notorious, 
continuous, exclusive, and adverse dominion and control over a property legally owned by 
another for a jurisdictionally determined period of time, will have a valid legal claim to 
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misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, neither of which was present in this case.92  It is 
no coincidence, then, that the majority’s citation of Federal Rule 21 omits the rule’s 
qualifying title.93   
B.  The Sins of the Father: The Progeny Problems 
For a time after Newman-Green, the federal courts largely did not sever parties 
without a misjoinder analysis, but in more recent years, the federal courts have taken 
the holding to a new level.  In 2009, plaintiff Anthony DeGidio brought suit in Ohio 
state court for products liability and medical malpractice against three drug 
companies and two individuals respectively for injuries allegedly caused by a 
prescription drug.94   The three companies’ principal places of business95 were in 
states diverse from Ohio, while a doctor, one of the individual defendants was a 
citizen of Ohio.96  The drug company defendants, without the participation of the 
individual defendants, removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction.97  DeGidio then filed a motion to remand the action to state court.98  The 
federal court acknowledged that complete diversity did not exist on the face of the 
complaint since both DeGidio and the defendant doctor were citizens of the state of 
Ohio.99 
The drug company defendants asserted three theories for why diversity 
jurisdiction had nonetheless been fulfilled: 1) the federal court’s power to sever 
dispensable parties under Federal Rule 21; 2) the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine; and 
                                                          
ownership rights of that property.  JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 124-29 (6th ed. 2006). 
The metaphor suggests that the Court’s majority has recognized a power so exercised by the 
lower courts as valid, not because the lower court followed the Federal Rules, but because of 
the manner in which it inconsistently exercised a power not granted therein.  
 
92
 Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 839 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 
93
 Id. at 832 (majority opinion). The Court’s citation states that “[p]arties may be dropped 
or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of 
the action and on such terms as are just.” Id. The Court did not include the title of Federal 
Rule 21, “Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties.” FED. R. CIV. P. 21.  
 
94
 DeGidio v. Centocor, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-721, 2009 WL 1867676, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 
29, 2009). 
 
95
 In 2010, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of “principal place of business.” See 
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).  
And we conclude that the phrase “principal place of business” refers to the place 
where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the 
corporation’s activities.  Lower federal courts have often metaphorically called that 
place the corporation’s “nerve center.”  We believe that the “nerve center” will 
typically be found at a corporation’s headquarters. 
Id. at 1186. 
 
96
 DeGidio, 2009 WL 1867676, at *3.  The citizenship of the second individual, a nurse, 
was unknown.  Id. 
 
97
 Id. at *1.  
 
98
 Id. at *3.  
 
99
 Id. at *4. 
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3) the fraudulent joinder doctrine.100  Without any initial examination of either 
fraudulent joinder or fraudulent misjoinder, the court cited Newman-Green to simply 
assert that “under Rule 21 . . . [it could] retain jurisdiction by severing claims against 
nondiverse dispensable defendants.”101   
Whether a party is properly joined and whether it is dispensable, however, are 
two very different analyses. While refusing to overtly apply the fraudulent 
misjoinder doctrine, DeGidio nonetheless reasoned that the drug company 
defendants were “not necessary” because the medical malpractice claims against the 
individuals involved “different legal standards and different factual allegations” than 
the product liability claim against the companies.102  This standard is analogous to 
the Federal Rule 20 misjoinder analysis because the court reasoned that while all the 
claims were valid, they did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence.103  The 
court, however, proceeded to an analysis of whether the drug companies were 
“necessary” or “indispensable” under Federal Rule 19.104  Federal Rule 19 governs 
required joinder, however, and DeGidio exercised his right to permissively join the 
drug companies under the state joinder rule analogous to Federal Rule 20.  The 
implication, then, in such an examination of whether the party is “indispensable” 
under Federal Rule 19, is that permissively joined parties in state court are likely 
dispensable parties in federal court.  Under this assumption, permissively joined 
parties in state court actions would often be severable by discretion under Federal 
Rule 21 when a defendant seeks to remove the case to federal court. 
DeGidio and similar cases105 are also distinguishable from Newman-Green on 
other grounds.  First, Newman-Green did not involve removal from state to federal 
court.106  The process of removal involves important concerns regarding federalism 
which are not present in actions filed originally in federal court.107  Second, plaintiff 
Newman-Green did not object to the dropping of Bettison, the nondiverse defendant, 
which indicates that the plaintiff may not have suffered prejudice under such an 
action.  Third, the Newman-Green Court warned that inferior courts should 
“carefully consider whether the dismissal of a nondiverse party will prejudice any of 
the parties in the litigation.”108  Fourth, the Court warned that the power to dismiss a 
                                                          
 
100
 Id.  
 
101
 Id. at *4. 
 
102
 Id. at *3.  
 
103
 FED. R. CIV. P. 20. This is not, however, a perfect analogy because under FED. R. CIV. P. 
20(a)(2)(B), “[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if [] any question of law 
or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” In DeGidio, there is at least one 
issue of fact common to both the drug company defendants and the individual defendants—
whether the prescription drug was indeed defective. Therefore, a Rule 20 analysis for 
misjoinder might result in finding that the parties were properly permissively joined, thus 
negating severance under Federal Rule 21. 
 
104
 DeGidio, 2009 WL 1867676. 
 
105
 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 
106
 See generally Newman-Green v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989). 
 
107
 DeGidio, 2009 WL 1867676, at *3.  
 
108
 Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 838.  
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dispensable nondiverse party should be “exercised sparingly.”109  Fifth, the Court 
warned against abuse, stating that it was “reluctant to disturb [the power to dismiss 
dispensable nondiverse parties] . . . particularly when there is no evidence that this 
authority has been abused . . . by district courts . . . .”110  Sixth, the Court noted that 
the failure to drop the defendant would have resulted in a waste of time and judicial 
resources.111 
VI.  THE PROBLEMS EXPOUNDED 
A.  No Outlet: The Limits of Inherent Power 
Since the language of Federal Rule 21 clearly applies only to misjoined and 
nonjoined parties, from what source does this power to proceed past jurisdictional 
satisfaction to sever parties flow?  As the dissent in Newman-Green points out, we 
are in a modern procedural era where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title 
28 provisions, not the common law, govern the procedure and jurisdiction of the 
federal district courts.112  The majority, however, cites to two cases from the 1800s 
for support, a time in which the modern Federal Rules did not exist.   The first 
case the Court cites is Carneal v. Banks,113 but this case does not support the notion 
that a court may drop properly joined parties.  In Carneal, Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote “[t]hat they have been improperly made defendants in his bill, cannot affect 
the jurisdiction of the Court as between those parties who are properly before it.”114  
Such a finding of improperly joined parties would justify the present day use of 
Federal Rule 21 to sever misjoined parties under either the fraudulent joinder or 
fraudulent misjoinder doctrines.115   
The second case the Newman-Green Court cites is more supportive of dropping a 
misjoined party to retain jurisdiction, but it proceeds from an argument of inherent 
power.  In Horn v. Lockhart,116 the Court reasoned, “the question always is . . . 
whether . . . [nondiverse parties] are indispensable parties, for if their interests are 
severable and a decree without prejudice to their rights can be made, the jurisdiction 
of the court should be retained and the suit dismissed as to them.”117  Although 
supportive of the majority’s proposition, the language “should be retained” indicates 
only that the Lockhart Court believed that it had discretion under its inherent power 
to dismiss a nondiverse and dispensable party.  In present day, however, although the 
Federal Rules appropriately allow judges wide latitude of discretion, the power to 
                                                          
 
109
 Id. at 837.  
 
110
 Id. at 833 (emphasis added).  
 
111
 Id. at 838.  
 
112
 Id. at 842 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 
113
 Carneal v. Banks, 23 U.S. 181 (1825). 
 
114
 Id. at 188 (emphasis added).  
 
115
 See supra Parts IV.C-D. 
 
116
 Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. 570 (1873). 
 
117
 Id. at 579.  
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dismiss properly joined parties to retroactively create jurisdiction for removal is not 
discretionary; it is imaginary.118  
While the use of judicial inherent power has a long history in the procedural 
scheme, no clarity exists as to the exact nature of a court’s inherent power.119  Since 
the implementation of the modern scheme of creating federal rules, courts have been 
vague in articulating the delineation between and the coexistence of inherent power 
and the rules of procedure.120  Federal Rules of procedure, however, should at least 
temper a court’s inherent power.  If a federal court maintains unlimited inherent 
power even where relevant procedural rules exist, this could render procedural rules 
meaningless.  Any exercise of inherent power should extend only to those areas that 
the rules do not address, and a court should not claim inherent power to change the 
history, purpose, and plain language of a federal rule. 
The Newman-Green Court proceeded under the assumption that the power to 
sever lies somewhere beyond what is plainly sanctioned within the Federal Rules 
themselves, and in so doing, the Court substituted the rule amendment process with 
its inherent power.  By judicial decree, the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of 
Federal Rule 21, with caveats, to drop properly joined parties despite the Rule’s 
purpose.  If the Court can exercise its inherent power to change the operation of a 
federal rule, then it has circumvented Congress’ intended mechanism for a multi-
layered rule-creation process121 and the systematic checks and balances that such a 
framework provides.  
Alternatively, some federal courts have held that they have inherent power to 
perfect jurisdiction by dropping a nondiverse defendant where the plaintiff is 
amenable to the option.122  But where a plaintiff is amenable to dismissing a 
nondiverse defendant, this is not an exercise of “inherent power;” the court simply 
bypasses the plaintiff’s need to file a motion to voluntarily dismiss the nondiverse 
                                                          
 
118
 See Percy, supra note 59, at 620 (“Newman-Green does not support the proposition that 
district courts may use Rule 21 to dismiss properly joined dispensable parties in order to 
create removal jurisdiction.”). 
 
119
 Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 311, 312 (2010). 
 
120
 Id.  Professor Samuel P. Jordan places a court’s inherent power into two categories: 1) 
gap-fillers; and 2) escape valves.  Id. at 313-16.  Gap-filling inherent powers “permit courts to 
use their inherent power to fill gaps left by an existing but incomplete procedural framework.”  
Id. at 313.  Escape valve inherent power is “used as an alternative source of authority in 
situations where a more formal procedure also applies . . . to circumvent the answer provided 
by a competing source of authority.”  Id. at 315.  Such a use of inherent power as an escape 
valve flouts the rule-creation process and frustrates litigants’ expectations.  Id.  
 
121
 Id. at Part I.B.3. 
 
122
 Neeld v. Am. Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459, 462 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (“It has long 
been established . . . that a federal court, on plaintiff’s motion, may drop a non-diverse 
defendant and retain jurisdiction if that party is [dispensable]. Although plaintiff has not made 
a motion to dismiss the state claim . . . this court has inherent power to perfect its jurisdiction 
and it would be needlessly ritualistic to require plaintiff to make such a motion prior to 
dismissing the state claim.”) (citing Horn v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. 570 (1873)) (emphasis added); 
see also Planning and Investing Co. v. Hemlock, 50 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Karakatsanis 
v. Conquestador Cia. Nav., S.A., 247 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).  
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defendant.123   These courts simply recognize the efficiency of bypassing the 
ritualism of requiring the plaintiff to first file a motion to dismiss where the court is 
aware that if given the chance, the plaintiff would have filed a motion to voluntarily 
dismiss the claim against the nondiverse party.124  An argument of inherent power 
here is misleading.  This exercise of discretion is merely a preemptive strike to 
promote efficiency and not an exercise of an inherent jurisdiction-perfecting power. 
The failure of the Newman-Green Court to specifically hold that Federal Rule 21 
itself empowers a district court to sever a properly joined nondiverse dispensable 
party represents a calculated hesitation by the majority.  The Court probably 
understood that the title and text of Federal Rule 21 did not support its holding, and 
this is likely the reason that the Supreme Court referred to the use of this tactic as 
“well-settled” by the lower courts rather than affirmatively asserting that Federal 
Rule 21 grants this power.125 
B.  Suspending Jurisdiction: Bypassing Complete Diversity 
Removal requires complete diversity.126  The doctrines of fraudulent joinder and, 
to a somewhat lesser extent, fraudulent misjoinder, have provided successful 
rationales for a court to drop improperly joined parties under Federal Rule 21 before 
finding complete diversity and proceeding to the merits of an action.  Because 
Congress has approved Federal Rules 19, 20 and 21, this judicial exercise is within 
the bounds of the power of the federal courts.  When, however, a federal court 
proceeds to severance under Federal Rule 21 without a finding of any recognized 
class of misjoinder, it takes action which is improper because complete diversity 
does not exist, and the court therefore has no power to act.127  Indeed, to take such an 
action, the court must first suspend the requirement for complete diversity under 
                                                          
 
123
 Neeld, 439 F. Supp. at 462. 
 
124
 Id.; see also Percy, supra note 59, at 619-20 (“Newman-Green [is] binding precedent to 
support [federal court] use of Rule 21 to create jurisdiction retroactively in cases originally 
filed in federal court where the plaintiff has no objection to the dismissal of the [nondiverse 
defendant] and where dismissal for lack of jurisdiction would waste judicial resources.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 
125
 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. 
 
126
 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (“The current general-diversity statute 
. . . applies only [where] the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each 
defendant.”); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (“[D]iversity 
jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from each 
plaintiff”); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S 267 (1806).    
 
127
 Shannon v. Mejias, No. 06-1191-MLB, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 80793, at *15-16 (E.D. 
Kan. Nov. 3, 2006) (refusing to sever because the court must first have jurisdiction to consider 
severance); Melton v. Merck & Co., No. 7:06-45-JMH, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37376, at *14 
(E.D. Ky. June 1, 2006) (“With no support for alleging misjoinder under Rule 20, [the] 
argument that Rules 19 and 21 can be employed after removal to create complete diversity and 
avoid remand is without merit.”); Gonzalez v. J.C. Penny Corp., Inc., No. 05-22254, 2005 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 44840,  at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2005) (“Until and unless a situation arises in 
which there exists complete diversity of citizenship, this court may not sever claims, it may 
not dismiss parties, it may do nothing but remand this action . . . .”). 
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both sections 1332 and 1441(a), and it must act in spite of this requirement.128  This 
use of Federal Rule 21, then, circumvents the statutes that Congress has passed to 
regulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts.  Indeed, it is a temporary exercise 
of diversity jurisdiction where none exists.129 
C.  Stealing Jurisdiction: The Concern for Federalism 
There are two levels on which a federal court severance of properly joined 
nondiverse parties improperly ignores the state court system.  The first level 
concerns the application of the Federal Rules instead of state rules to find 
misjoinder.130  Most federal courts utilize the state joinder rule, while some utilize 
the federal joinder rule to evaluate fraudulent misjoinder.131  In many states, the 
corresponding rule is identical or similar to the Federal Rule so that same result will 
occur, but in other states the rule is different and the court could come to a different 
result in applying that standard.132  In this instance, an application of the federal rule 
ignores the state’s authority to formulate and enforce its own joinder rules.133  The 
state may utilize its own joinder rules to find that no nondiverse party was 
improperly joined.  If the plaintiff properly joined a nondiverse defendant in state 
court, but the federal court measures misjoinder by the Federal Rules, then a federal 
court must ignore the plaintiff’s state court procedural rights.   
The second level of federal dominance concerns the use of Federal Rule 21 to 
sever parties where the federal court does not find, or it claims that it need not at all 
examine misjoinder.134  Where there is no finding of misjoinder, the federal court, by 
carving up an action that may have been properly joined in a state court into separate 
actions, seizes a case from the jurisdiction of the state court with no regard for the 
operation of the state court.135  Moreover, even cases that employ Federal Rule 21 in 
                                                          
 
128
 Hines & Gensler, supra note 1, at 797; see also Shannon v. Mejias, No. 06-1191-MLB, 
2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 80793, at *16 (E.D. Kan. Nov. 3, 2006) (“A court simply cannot create 
diversity jurisdiction by carving out the non-diverse parties in a case removed from the state 
system.”). 
 
129
 See Shannon, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90793, at *16 (finding that using Rule 21 to sever 
actions originally brought in federal court is distinct from cases that are removed to federal 
court from state court); see also Hines & Gensler, supra note 1, at 797. 
 
130
 There is controversy surrounding which standard to apply. For further reading, see 
Percy, supra note 59, at 590.  
 
131
 Id. at 591.  
 
132
 Hines & Gensler, supra note 1, at 812.  
 
133
 See Percy supra, note 59, at Part V.A. 
 
134
 DeGidio v. Centocor, Inc., No. 3:09CV721, 2009 WL 1867676, at *4 (N.D. Ohio June 
29, 2009) (stating that because Federal Rule 21 allows the court the power to drop dispensable 
parties, it need not examine whether diversity jurisdiction exists under an analysis of 
fraudulent joinder or misjoinder). 
 
135
 Cassens v. Cassens, 430 F. Supp. 2d 830, 838 n.4 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (conceding that there 
is authority to support dropping parties to preserve jurisdiction in actions brought originally to 
the federal court, but stating “the Court is not aware of any controlling authority authorizing 
the use of Rule 21 to permit a federal court to exercise jurisdiction in a removed case over the 
objections of a plaintiff.”). 
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this manner acknowledge that the principles of federalism require that the removal 
statute be strictly construed, and that any doubts should be resolved against removal 
from the state court system.136   
By acknowledging the federalism concerns raised by removal and nevertheless 
severing nondiverse properly joined parties, some federal courts have decided that 
there is no doubt about the propriety of their use of Federal Rule 21 and that this use 
does not interfere with state jurisdiction.  A federal court, however, acting without 
jurisdiction to take an action which the state otherwise would have the power to 
adjudicate, deprives the state court of its jurisdiction.  Not only does severance under 
these circumstances infringe upon state authority, but it conflicts with other 
provisions in the Federal Rules themselves. 
D.  Federal Rule 82 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 states that “[t]hese rules do not extend or 
limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue of actions in those courts.”137  
The Federal Rules should not be construed in such a manner to extend the district 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.138  In his Newman-Green dissent, Justice Kennedy 
wrote that “[s]ince dismissing a nondiverse party confers jurisdiction retroactively 
on the district court, it is questionable whether relying on Federal Rule 21 is 
consistent with Federal Rule 82’s clear admonition.”139  While dropping an 
improperly joined party would arguably not violate Federal Rule 82,140 dropping a 
properly joined nondiverse party would violate this rule because, here, the court acts 
without subject matter jurisdiction to create subject matter jurisdiction.141 
                                                          
 
136
 Thomas v. Bank of Am. Corp., 570 F.3d 1280, 1282 n.4 (11th Cir. 2009); Adventure 
Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008); Queen ex rel. Province of 
Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 
137
 FED. R. CIV. P. 82. 
 
138
 Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 840 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“It must be remembered . . . that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 expressly 
provides that the other Rules must not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the 
district courts.”); see also Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 664  (1996); Cantanella 
v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005); Easter v. Am. W. Fin., 381 F.3d 948, 963 
(9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equip. and Accessories, 200 F.3d 
203, 216 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
139
 Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 840 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 
140
 But see Palermo v. Letourneau Techs., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 499, 517 (S.D. Miss. 2008) 
(“[A] district court may run afoul of Rule 82 if it uses a federal rule to determine if the 
plaintiff’s claims were properly joined under state law at the time of removal.”); Percy, supra 
note 59, at 595 (applying federal joinder rules instead of state joinder rules to determine 
misjoinder may violate Rule 82). 
 
141
 Gonzalez v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. 05-22254, 2005 U.S. Lexis 44840,  at *6 (S.D. Fla. 
Nov. 7, 2005) (“Using Rule 21 in [this] manner . . . would allow a district court to ‘create’ 
jurisdiction on removal simply by dismissing nondiverse, dispensable [parties] . . . .”) (citation 
omitted).  
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E.  Federal Rule 1 and Undue Hardship on Plaintiffs 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that the Federal Rules “should be 
construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action and proceeding.”142   The district courts have an affirmative duty to 
utilize procedure to ensure a fair resolution of matters without excessive cost or 
delay.143  When a federal court utilizes Federal Rule 21 to sever a properly joined 
dispensable nondiverse party, the court runs the risk of violating Federal Rule 1.144  
Upon severing, the court will either dismiss without prejudice145 or remand the 
nondiverse party to state court.  Subdividing a case into multiple actions where they 
arise from the same transaction or occurrence,146 however, may frustrate Federal 
Rule 1 by requiring the inefficiency of separate cases — one in federal court and one 
in state court.147  Moreover, even Newman-Green recognizes that such a use of 
Federal Rule 21 might prejudice parties to the litigation.148  
Courts have found severance to be improper where the severance causes 
prejudice or delay, produces judicial inefficiency, or precipitates fundamental 
unfairness.149  Some courts, however, have recently reasoned that the creation of 
multiple actions by severing a nondiverse party does not produce results egregious 
enough to violate the Federal Rule 1 mandate of efficient, cost-effective 
                                                          
 
142
 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  
 
143
 Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs of Fremont, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (D. Colo. 1994) 
(noting that even if the parties themselves do not raise objections, the courts themselves are 
obligated to consider the goals of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1). 
 
144
 Baker v. Tri-Nations Express, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2008) 
(“[A]ny Rule 21 discretion to dismiss parties and sever claims to ‘create’ jurisdiction does not 
extend to the instant situation and requested action, nor does it promote judicial economy 
where all of the claims arise out of one accident.”). 
 
145
 A dismissal “without prejudice” leaves the plaintiff with the opportunity to re-file its 
complaint against the nondiverse dispensable party in another action.  Semtek Int’l Inc. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001). 
 
146
 FED. R. CIV. P. 20. 
 
147
 See e.g., Garcia v. Sandoz Inc., No. CV-10-87,  2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 42505, at * 11 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2010); Ash v. Providence Hosp., No. 08-0525-WS-M, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 12794, at *43 (S.D. Ala. 2009); Baker v. Tri-Nations Express, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 
1307, 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (“[A]ny Rule 21 discretion to dismiss parties and sever claims to 
‘create’ jurisdiction does not extend to the instant situation and requested action, nor does it 
promote judicial economy where all of the claims arise out of one accident.”).  
 
148
 Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837-38 (1989). 
 
149
 See id.; Garcia, No. CV-10-87 at * 11 (“A Court may determine that severance is 
improper if severance would cause prejudice and delay, decrease judicial economy, or fail to 
the [sic] safeguard principals of fundamental fairness.” ); see also Acevedo v. Allsup’s 
Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Coleman v. Quaker Oats 
Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir 2000)); Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 67 F.3d 
571, 574 n.12 (5th Cir. 1995); Morris v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 37 F. Supp. 2d 556, 581 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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procedure.150  Other courts have failed to even address the inefficiencies produced by 
severance and have instead relied upon the fact that the plaintiff still has a remedy 
against the dismissed or remanded nondiverse party in state court.151  These 
decisions implicitly indicate compliance with Federal Rule 1.  Whether a plaintiff 
still has a remedy against the severed party, however, does not sufficiently address 
the mandates of Federal Rule 1.  The plaintiff is ultimately prejudiced in relation to 
the cost and inefficiency inevitably produced by the necessity of maintaining two 
related actions in separate forums.  
VII.  THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represent the full and complete 
procedural options available to federal district courts or they do not.  If they do not 
represent complete procedural power, and the federal courts wield too vast inherent 
power beyond the rules themselves, then the level of predictability or uniformity in 
the federal legal system is jeopardized.  At any time, a court might cite a nineteenth 
century case for its procedural analysis in an attempt to circumvent the Federal Rules 
and to give a federal district court the option of rediscovering an “inherent power.”  
Federal Rule 21 is either limited to misjoined parties as its plain language suggests, 
or it is not.   
There are two possible branches of government that could solve the problems 
created by the Supreme Court’s ambiguous statement that the use of Federal Rule 21 
to drop dispensable properly joined parties is “well-settled” by the district courts 
while failing to hold whether Federal Rule 21 itself actually grants this power to the 
district courts.152  The judicial branch itself could rectify its own ambiguity by the 
exercise of judicial restraint by amending the current Federal Rule 21, or by 
following the procedures established to add a new federal rule to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  Changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, is a 
combined approach, since congressional approval would be required.  While a 
judicial branch solution is ideal, congressional action could also solve the problem.  
If the federal courts continue to ignore the plain language and purpose of Federal 
Rule 21, Congress should simply exercise its power to amend the grant of diversity 
jurisdiction to exclude this misuse of Federal Rule 21.  Alternatively, Congress 
should amend the removal statute to define “properly joined” parties.  
A.  A Restrained Approach from the Bench 
First, a federal court should limit its exercise of Federal Rule 21 to sever 
nondiverse parties in removal actions only when they are improperly joined under 
either a finding of fraudulent joinder153 or fraudulent misjoinder.154  If the district 
                                                          
 
150
 DeGidio v. Centocor, Inc., No. 3:09CV721,  2009 WL 1867676, at *4  (N.D. Ohio June 
29, 2009) (“While fighting on two fronts will no doubt be inconvenient, and probably more 
expensive, I do not find the maintenance of two lawsuits unfairly or unduly prejudicial.”). 
 
151
 See Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand at 7, Williams v. Knoll Pharm. Co., 
No. 5:03-CV-8030-JG (N.D. Ohio July 11th, 2003) (PACER) (“Further, the . . . plaintiffs have 
an adequate remedy if the Court drops the nondiverse Physician Defendants because the . . . 
plaintiffs can proceed with their claims against the . . . Defendants in state court.”).  
 
152
 See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. 
 
153
 See supra Part IV.C. 
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court has not adopted the doctrine of fraudulent misjoinder, it should do so before 
exercising Federal Rule 21 to sever improperly joined parties where the requirements 
of Federal Rule 20 are not met.  However, in the event that a federal court turns to 
Newman-Green, it should limit this precedent to its unique set of facts.  There, the 
Court recognized the use of Federal Rule 21 to drop a dispensable nondiverse party 
to create diversity jurisdiction but only where the action was originally brought in 
federal court, where the plaintiff was amenable to the severance, where there existed 
no prejudice to the parties, and where no waste of judicial resources would occur.155 
Moreover, the Court warned that such a procedure should be used only rarely.156 
Removal actions differ from cases originally brought in federal court.  A federal 
court should consider the principles of federalism when deciding whether to take 
jurisdiction from a case originally filed in state court.157  The principles of federalism 
require the court to resolve any ambiguities or doubts in favor of remand.158  A 
federal court, therefore, should respect the independent power of the state court to 
hear a case properly brought before it without manipulating the party lineup in a 
manner that overrides state court jurisdiction.  Utilizing Federal Rule 21 to sever 
parties only upon a finding of misjoinder not only properly balances the right of the 
plaintiff to choose a state court forum and the statutory right of the defendant to 
remove an improperly joined case to federal court, but it also respects the plain 
language of Federal Rule 21 and the spirit of its historical predecessors.  
A court should not exercise its inherent power to change the fundamental 
purpose of Federal Rule 21 as a substitute for the rule amendment process.  
Proponents of vast judicial discretion might reject the idea of a more narrow use of 
inherent power, even where existing Federal Rules regulate a procedure such as 
joinder.159  In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the Supreme Court asserted that federal 
courts necessarily enjoy a level of implied powers “which cannot be dispensed 
with.”160  One might argue that this inherent power of the federal courts allows for 
liberal interpretation of procedural rules.  For dropping properly joined parties, 
however, the Supreme Court has tied its perceived inherent power to Federal Rule 21 
itself.161   In this sense, the Court has not simply asserted an inherent power beyond 
the Rules, but has utilized its inherent power to change the meaning of a 
promulgated Rule.   
                                                          
 
154
 See supra Part IV.D. 
 
155
 Percy, supra note 59, at 619-20. 
 
156
 Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837 (1989) (“Although we hold 
that the courts of appeals have the authority to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party, we 
emphasize that such authority should be exercised sparingly.”). 
 
157
 See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); Franchise Tax 
Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 
158
 Cheshire v. Coca-Cola Bottling Affiliated, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1098, 1102 (D.S.C. 1990). 
 
159
 Struve, supra note 26, at 1130. 
 
160
 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (citation omitted). 
 
161
  In Newman-Green, the Court cited two cases from the 1800s pre-dating the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure as support for an inherent power to drop properly joined parties, but 
then brought this inherent power into the interpretation of Federal Rule 21 despite the Rule’s 
plain language and historical purpose. See supra Part VI.A.   
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Instead of claiming inherent power, federal courts should first utilize Federal 
Rules 19, 20, and 21 to regulate joinder.  While federal courts do enjoy an 
undetermined level of inherent procedural power,162 the court should not over 
emphasize its inherent power where the rules creation process has produced a 
procedural rule or several procedural rules together to regulate a procedure such as 
joinder of parties.  If the inherent power of the court is not at least tempered where 
formal rules exist, then procedural rules themselves, as well as the process that 
produces them, become meaningless.  For these reasons, a court should rely upon the 
history and purpose of Federal Rule 21 to restrict its application to the severance of 
only misjoined parties.  
B.  Follow Procedure: Amend the Federal Rules 
Instead of exercising Federal Rule 21 in a manner inconsistent with its mandate, 
the federal courts should seek to amend Federal Rule 21 itself, or they should seek to 
create a new federal rule by splitting Federal Rule 21 into two separate rules.  Since 
such a process would entail approval by Congress,163 and because the Constitution 
ultimately vests Congress with the power to establish inferior federal courts,164 
following this process would preserve the constitutional intent for Congress to 
regulate the federal courts.  The rules creation process as established by Congress 
should be preserved and followed. 
In its present form, Federal Rule 21 is entitled “Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of 
Parties” and expressly provides that “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for 
dismissing an action.  On motion, or on its own, the court may at any time, on just 
terms, add or drop a party.  The court may also sever any claim against a party.”165  
If, as the title suggests, the federal courts wish to expand the scope of Federal Rule 
21 beyond misjoined parties, a proposed rule should expressly indicate such an 
expansion, and Congress should be given the opportunity to weigh the consequences 
of such a rule.166  Following the rules creation process ensures a multi-layered review 
of a proposal before its implementation, as intended by Congress.167   
Alternatively, a new severance rule, wholly separate from Federal Rule 21, 
should be introduced to encompass the recent declaration of some federal district 
courts that they have the power to sever nondiverse dispensable parties in order 
create diversity jurisdiction whenever they deem appropriate.  Such a rule, however, 
would still conflict with the mandate of Federal Rule 82 that the Federal Rules do 
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 Jordan, supra note 119, at 312. 
 
163
 See supra text and accompanying notes 21-24. 
 
164
 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 9. 
 
165
 FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 
166
 Such a rule might still conflict with Federal Rule 82, supra Part VI.D, and with Federal 
Rule 1, supra Part VI.E.  
 
167
 Struve, supra note 26, at 1140.  “Requiring that changes take place through the 
rulemaking process – rather than through adjudication – at least increases the chances that 
amendments will be subjected to a deliberative process and informed by practical knowledge.  
In addition, the structure of the rulemaking process facilitates informed and deliberative 
decision making and permits a holistic approach to the revision of the Rules.” Id.  
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not “extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts.”168  This solution is 
proposed only because it would necessitate congressional action to either grant or to 
ultimately deny this “procedural” power to the federal courts.  If the judicial branch, 
having already asserted such a power, avoids the proper rule amendment process, 
congressional remedial action, although unlikely, remains possible. 
C.  Congressional Action 
There is a real possibility in the future that courts will further continue to fracture 
on the proper use of Federal Rule 21. If the problem worsens to the point where 
uniformity and predictability become severely impaired for plaintiffs, Congress 
could take action. In the absence of judicial restraint, Congress should exercise its 
authority to regulate the practice and procedure of the federal courts.169  Although 
Congress has delegated the bulk of its rule making authority to the judicial branch 
through the Rules Enabling Act,170  Congress retains the right to amend or to abridge 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by statute.171  The Federal Rules hold 
“presumptive validity,”172 but may still be challenged as inconsistent with the powers 
delegated by Congress.173  Here, the problem is not with Federal Rule 21 itself, but 
with the evolving interpretation of the Federal Rule.  Congress has two options for 
amending statutes to curtail the use of Federal Rule 21 by district courts to create 
diversity jurisdictions in removal actions by dropping properly joined nondiverse 
parties: it can either amend the diversity statute or amend the removal statute. 
1.  The Broad Approach: Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
Should federal courts fail to exercise the proper restraint in their application of 
Federal Rule 21, Congress could amend 28 U.S.C. section 1332, its diversity 
jurisdiction key to the federal courts.  Congress should take a broad approach and 
require a finding of misjoinder as a prerequisite to severance under Federal Rule 21 
as its text suggests.  Such an approach would not only prevent severance without 
misjoinder in removal actions, but would abrogate Newman-Green, in that 
misjoinder would become a necessary prerequisite even for actions brought 
originally to the federal court.  The language of 28 U.S.C. section 1441 incorporates 
the definition of diversity jurisdiction into section 1332.  A broad approach would 
require a change to the grant of diversity jurisdiction in section 1332 since section 
1441 is dependent upon the definition of section 1332’s jurisdictional grant on 
diversity grounds.  Under this mechanism, then, Congress would preserve its power 
to hold the keys to the jurisdiction of the federal courts under both its statutory grant 
of diversity jurisdiction174 and its statutory grant of removal.175  
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 FED. R. CIV. P. 82.  
 
169
 Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 134 (5th Cir. 1996); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 
U.S. 1, 9-10, 61 (1941); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 21 (1825). 
 
170
 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 
171
 Jackson, 102 F.3d at 134; Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958). 
 
172
 Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 42 F.3d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1995).  
 
173
 Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946). 
 
174
 28 U.S.C.A § 1332 (West 2010). 
 
175
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West 2010).  
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Section 1332 should be amended to expressly state that a district court may not 
manipulate an action to create diversity jurisdiction by dropping or severing any 
party or claim where the parties have been properly permissively joined in one action 
under the same requirements as Federal Rule 20.  Such an amendment would limit 
the use of Federal Rule 21 to its plain language in that severance would be limited to 
only improperly joined parties.  This amendment would allow the federal courts to 
retain a level of discretion to determine when parties are improperly joined under 
Federal Rule 20.  Should the state rule of joinder in the rare instance, however, 
conflict with Federal Rule 20, the state rule should take precedent over the Federal 
Rule.176  This amendment would also eliminate the illogical test of dispensability and 
require the courts to adopt the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine if they wish to dismiss 
or to sever parties against whom plaintiffs assert insufficiently related claims.  
Parties otherwise properly permissively joined under Federal Rule 20 or the state 
corollary could not be severed simply to create diversity jurisdiction. Although this 
is the better Congressional solution, another narrower approach would remain 
available to Congress. 
2.  The Narrow Approach: Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1441 
While section 1441, the removal statute, already contains a requirement that 
parties be properly joined to be removed,177 there has been disagreement as to what 
joinder analysis to apply.178  Defining “properly joined” within section 1441 to 
denote compliance with Federal Rule 20 or its state corollary with an express 
assertion that a district court may not manipulate an action to create diversity 
jurisdiction by dropping or severing any party or claim where the parties have been 
properly permissively joined in one state court action would neuter the improper use 
of Federal Rule 21.179  While amending the removal statute alone would not 
ultimately affect the current use of Federal Rule 21 to sever nondiverse dispensable 
parties to create diversity jurisdictions in actions brought originally in federal court, 
it would curtail the same application of Federal Rule 21 to actions removed by 
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 See supra Part VI.C. 
 
177
 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(b) (West 2010).  No legislative history exists, however, as to the 
purpose of the phrase “properly joined and served” within the removal statute.  Sullivan v. 
Novartis Pharms. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644 (D.N.J. 2008).  Nevertheless, many courts 
have determined that the terminology is meant to prevent a plaintiff from gamesmanship 
designed to defeat removal by joining a party who the plaintiff does not actually intend to 
serve as a party to the action.  Id. at 643; see also Stan Winston Creatures, Inc. v. Toys “R” 
Us, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Under a plain language analysis, 
however, there may be an argument to be made that the language encompasses fraudulent 
joinder of parties.   
 
178
 Courts that misuse Federal Rule 21 to sever nondiverse dispensable parties in removal 
actions utilize Federal Rule 19 governing required joinder to measure dispensability, and 
therefore the only way to be properly joined under this analysis is to be indispensable to the 
action. Courts that properly first require a finding of fraudulent misjoinder will utilize Federal 
Rule 20 or the comparable state joinder rule to measure whether parties have been properly 
permissively joined together in the action. 
 
179
 Note, however, that in this amendment Congress should clarify whether the standard for 
“properly joined parties” should be measured by Federal Rule 20 or the comparable state 
permissive joinder rule. See supra note 130. 
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defendants from state to federal court.  This solution is appropriate, however, only if 
Congress first determines that the current use of Federal Rule 21, as expanded by 
Newman-Green, is proper as to actions brought originally in federal court.  To curtail 
all infractions, however, the better solution is for Congress to take the broad 
approach and amend its requirements for diversity jurisdiction under section 1332. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 and its historical ancestors support the 
procedural power of a federal court to drop or sever only misjoined claims or parties.  
The vague and circular reasoning of Newman-Green has led federal courts to use 
Federal Rule 21 to carve up removal actions where parties are properly joined in 
state court to create diversity jurisdiction in federal court.  Since Congress ultimately 
controls the procedure of federal courts and has set up a multi-layered process for 
rule creation, a federal court should temper its use of inherent power where that 
process has produced sufficient procedural rules.  Moreover, this misuse of Federal 
Rule 21 not only obstructs the principles of federalism, but it conflicts with other 
provisions of the Federal Rules themselves.  In the absence of judicial restraint, 
Congress should ultimately amend its statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction to 
disallow the misuse of Federal Rule 21 to create jurisdiction in removal actions 
where there is none. 
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